Abstract. This paper studies the strategy consensus for a class of random evolutionary games, that is, random evolutionary Boolean games (REBG), by using the semi-tensor product of matrices. The RBEG is converted into an algebraic form, based on which, a necessary and sufficient condition is presented to check the strategy consensus for REBG. A numerical example is worked out to illustrate the efficiency of the obtained results.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory mainly studies the evolution of strategies, and the strategies are updated under strategy profile dynamics [1] . It has wide applications in economy, social science, anthropology, physics, and philosophy [2] . Therefore, evolutionary game theory has attracted many scholars' interests, and a lot of interesting results have been established in the last two decades [3, 4] .
As a special class of evolutionary games, evolutionary Boolean game is of great importance in biology, physics and systems science [5] . For instance, Prisoner's Dilemma [6] , Snowdrift Game [7] , and Hawk-Dove Game [8] are familiar Boolean games. In an evolutionary Boolean game, there only exists two strategies (ON or OFF, TRUE or FALSE, etc.), denoted by "0" and "1" [9] . Thus, the strategy updating rules are Boolean functions of history strategies and game results. At some time, there may be randomness in the strategy updating rule, for that players may make mistakes when they play games. In this case, the dynamics of evolutionary Boolean games becomes a random evolutionary Boolean games (REBG). Wang and Ma proposed an algorithm to learn the strategy updating rule for a two person REBG by using the records of the history strategies and game results [10] . However, there exist fewer results on the strategy consensus of REBG.
Recently, a huge development in the study of finite-valued systems is the algebraic state space approach proposed by D. Cheng [11] , which is based on the semi-tensor product (STP). The algebraic state space approach has been successfully applied to express and analyze Boolean networks, and many excellent works have been presented [11, 12] .
In this paper, we study the strategy consensus of evolutionary Boolean games by using the algebraic state space approach. The main content of this paper consists of the following: We convert the REBG into an algebraic form by using the semi-tensor product of matrices. We present a necessary and sufficient condition for the strategy consensus of REBG based on the algebraic form. We apply the obtained results to the strategy consensus of the Palm game.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: Section II is some preliminaries on the semi-tensor product of matrices. Section III presents the main results of this paper. A numerical example is work out in Section IV, which is followed by a conclusion in Section V.
Preliminaries
To start with, we present some notations. 1)
Col X is the i -th column of matrix X ;
 
Col X is the set of columns of . [11] .The semi-tensor product (STP) of two matrices ,
where ( , ) s lcm n p  is the least common multiple of n and p , and  is the Kronecker product.
Proposition 1 [11] . Let k x   be a column vector and
Definition 2 [11] . The Khatri-Rao product of two matrices
Proposition 2 [11] . Assume that
 is a power-reducing matrix.
Proposition 3 [11] . Assume , ,
Lemma 1 [11] . Let   , , , ,
Main Results
The dynamics of a random evolutionary Boolean game is given as follows:
x t f X t t p y t x t f X t t p y t y t h X t
where (7) has the following algebraic form: 
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Then we have the following result. Theorem 2. The system (7) 
Numerical Example
To start with, we introduce the best response strategy updating rule: ( 1) i x t  is selected from the best strategy among the strategies of its neighbors ( ) 
then we choose one according to a priority as
Example 1. Assume the network of the game is 3 R [ Fig. 1 ] and the basic game is the Palm game. The strategy set is
The payoff bi-matrix of the Palm game is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 . Payoff matrix. 
